Consumer must get quality service and value for money

Until recently, the quality of infrastructure service provided to consumers was of no concern, either to the government or to the service providers. The law regulating these sectors also did not address the quality of service. For example, while the Electricity Act, 1910, set standards of safety, it did not set any standards for quality of service. Similar was the case in the telecom and port sectors. As a result, consumers usually received poor quality of service. No time limits were set, for instance, for fault repair in the electricity or telephone services, power fluctuations were rampant, or telephones remained dead for days on. Regulatory legislation have for the first time sought to address quality and consumer satisfaction. The provisions of the CERC and TRAI Acts for quality are in line with international practices. In the UK, the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act, 1992, recognises the need for quality improvements in the infrastructure sector. It outlined the standards of performance, the disposal of complaints and disputes and the level of performance of each public electricity supplier, and the regulatory power to determine the accuracy in the electricity bills. In Sri Lanka, the telecom regulator takes steps to ensure that quality of services conforms to standards specified. If full charges for telephone installation are collected at the outset, the regulator ensures that a working telephone is provided within 30 days or the consumer paid Rs 1000 for each week of delay beyond 30 days. In India, the issue of quality has just about begun to be addressed. In the power sector, the Orissa regulator has taken the lead in setting standards of service for distribution utilities. They are required to bring down voltage fluctuations within specified limits within 15 working days of complaint in 60 per cent of cases, and have to restore supply within 24 hours of fault in 80 per cent of cases. These standards are backed by provisions for imposition of penalties for violations. There are procedures for grievance redressal. The regulator in Andhra Pradesh also has taken initiatives to ensure quality. But in the other ten states where the regulatory commissions have come into existence, the regulators are yet to address the quality of service issue. TRAI had in November 1998 issued a consultation paper, proposing certain benchmarks on consumer facility, technical parameters, quality of connection, and grades of services. It suggested criteria for assessment of the quality of various services, penalties and rebates in the customer rental for non-performance, an elaborate feedback mechanism for monitoring, and a mechanism for redressing the consumer complaints. These were, however, diluted when TRAI in July 2000 issued a Regulation on Quality of Service of Basic and Cellular Mobile Telephone Services with fewer parameters than originally suggested. The regulation now seeks to create conditions for customer satisfaction by making known the quality of service which the service provider has to provide and the measure of performance against standards. Unfortunately, however, it does not provide for any penalties for default or compensation to the consumers, or even for a quick grievance redressal mechanism. Unlike in the telecom and power sectors, quality improvements were not envisaged in the regulatory legislation in the port sector. TAMP, however, in its 1998 consultation paper called for quality services and said the user should not suffer from inefficiencies. It then applied this concept in the case of Marmagoa Port Trust, where it approved an efficiency linked increase in vessel charges. It is legitimate to expect the regulators to set the standard of services, monitor the performance of utilities, and award penalties or rebates in case of failure. They should also link tariff increases with improvements in quality of service. Regulators, under the present situation, may have difficulty in bringing about dramatic improvements in the quality of services in a short time. That is because the networks have deteriorated and any upgradation would require additional investments, which can happen only when the financial condition of the utilities improves with tariff reform. It is, however, necessary for the regulator to determine a time frame for improvements in the quality of service, and link this to tariff increases. It would be naive for consumers to expect that the regulator on its own would ensure their total satisfaction. The role of consumer, in quality improvements, therefore, assumes great importance. Consumers have to be informed and educated on issues involveing tariff, quality, availability, etc. They have to be organised to press their case. In the initial years, governments should provide assistance to consumer groups to present their case before the regulatory commissions, as is done in the US. And, there should be continuous interaction between the consumers and regulators. The efforts of CERC, Ahmedabad, and CUTS, Jaipur, in involving consumers in regulatory governance have to be emulated in other states as well. Research institutions too have a major role to play to ensure that quality issues remain on the top of the regulatory agenda. Most of the recent deliberations have tended to focus on technical and pricing issues, and not on quality and consumer satisfaction. Hopefully, their priorities will change. If the objectives of regulatory reform, namely consumer satisfaction and welfare, are to be fully realised, multi-pronged action is called for. The consumers must get value for money, and make their priorities known to the service provider and the regulator. It would be naive for consumers to expect that the regulator on its own would ensure their total satisfaction. The role of consumer, in quality improvements, therefore, assumes great importance. Consumers have to be informed and educated on issues involveing tariff, quality, availability, etc. They have to be organised to press their case.